Opinion Report \nAt one time, Bangladesh’s ruling class considered the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) issue to be an economic and law-and-order problem. In response, in 1976, Ziaur Rahman formed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board and deployed the military extensively in the region. Additionally, in 1979, as part of a \u201ccounter-insurgency\u201d strategy to suppress the Shanti Bahini insurgency, he began settling people from the plains onto indigenous lands in the hills. These actions did not resolve the issue; instead, they greatly exacerbated it.<\/p>\n After Zia\u2019s death, military ruler General Ershad also initially tried to solve the CHT issue through military means. However, when that failed, he took a political initiative and, in 1985, started the first dialogue with the Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS).<\/p>\n Following this, the government of Khaleda Zia, after the 1990 mass uprising, also continued political dialogue. Eventually, after the Awami League came to power following the 1996 elections, a peace accord was signed on December 2, 1997, following multiple rounds of discussions.<\/p>\n While this accord raised hopes for peace, it contained significant flaws. The United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) pointed out these weaknesses and criticized the agreement. However, the parties to the accord could not tolerate this valid criticism from the UPDF. As a result, a severe crackdown was launched against the UPDF. Yet, by criticizing the accord, the UPDF did not commit any crime or wrongdoing. They were merely exercising their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Despite this, the UPDF came under intense attack\u2014on one side from the Bangladesh government, and on the other from the JSS. There\u2019s no room here to elaborate on that in full, but it is enough to say that to understand the current situation in the CHT, one must understand how repression of the UPDF began after the accord.<\/p>\n At present, everyone acknowledges and agrees that the CHT problem is a political one. Even military officials admit this. The current instability and unrest in the region clearly show that the 1997 Peace Accord has failed to provide a genuine political solution to the problem. In reality, the current situation in the CHT is a result of the inherent weaknesses of the accord and the undemocratic, fascist mindset of its signatories. The people of this country have deeply experienced the consequences of such lack of democracy and rise of fascism. These fascists\u2014whether military or civilian\u2014ultimately cause irreparable harm to themselves, society, and the nation.<\/p>\n If the CHT problem is political, then logically, it should be resolved politically. But over the past 27 years, we have not seen such political initiatives. Instead, since the signing of the accord, there has been a fascist-style use of force to suppress so-called \u201copponents of the accord.\u201d Both signatory parties to the accord have united in this repression. The government aimed to prevent any new movement from emerging among the hill people. On the other hand, the JSS believed that it alone represented the legitimate voice of the Jumma (hill) people. Therefore, it opposed the formation of any other political party among them. As a result, we saw that both the then-Awami League government and the JSS had common goals and strategies concerning the UPDF after the accord.<\/p>\n Though the Awami League is no longer in power, its policy on the CHT remains unchanged. The Hasina government had effectively leased the region to the military, and the current Yunus government has not revoked or been able to revoke that lease. The real governing authority in the CHT does not lie with the political leadership in Dhaka but with the military officers stationed there. They control everything in the hills and have been attempting for the past 27 years to solve this political problem through military means. As part of their mission to eliminate or destroy the UPDF, armed vigilante groups are active in the hills\u2014much like in other districts of the country\u2014even though there is no insurgency here. Despite facing extreme repression, the UPDF has not turned to armed struggle or insurgency. Instead, they have continued their movement through democratic means and have allied with other progressive parties and organizations in the country. However, military officials in the CHT are responding to this democratic movement with counter-insurgency tactics. It’s like trying to cure jaundice by performing eye surgery simply because the patient has yellow eyes. This is the root cause of the current problems in the CHT.<\/p>\n But we know that when a disease is diagnosed, it should be treated accordingly. If the CHT problem is political, it must be resolved through political means. Any attempt to solve a political issue militarily is bound to fail, as it has in the past. Therefore, if we truly want to establish peace in the CHT, we cannot leave the solution solely in the hands of generals who only know left-right maneuvers. They must be brought fully under civilian political leadership, and a political initiative must be taken. There is no alternative to a political solution for the CHT problem.<\/p>\n (October 16, 2025)<\/p>\n —————-<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Opinion Report At one time, Bangladesh’s ruling class considered the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) issue to be an economic and law-and-order problem. In response, in 1976, Ziaur Rahman formed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board and deployed the military extensively in the region. Additionally, in 1979, as part of a \u201ccounter-insurgency\u201d strategy to suppress the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":5512,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5511","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-commentary"],"yoast_head":"\n
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